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The Army National Guard Special Forces has a unique position that allows state 
governors to call upon the group to support domestic operations and provide additional 
forces for the United States Army Special Forces Command when needed. The necessity 
to coordinate the emerging domestic operations being undertaken or discussed by the 
Army National Guard Special Forces has been identified as a shortcoming by senior 
leaders of the Army National Guard and their Special Operations advisors, but little has 
been done to ensure the coordination and collaboration is executed. The newly 
established Special Operations Command – North is ideally situated to assist in this 
effort.  
This thesis examines the difficulties of coordinating operations conducted in a 
Title 32 status across state lines and with a command element that is a Title 10 force. 
Additionally, given the unique laws and policies that dictate defense support to civil 
authorities, this thesis analyzes what the Army National Guard Special Forces has done 
and is currently doing and how Special Operations Command – North can fit into the 
homeland defense mission set. This thesis concludes with recommendations on 
developing the relationship between the states, Special Operations Command – North and 
Special Operations Command’s Global SOF Network and where the manpower and 
funding can come from for the emerging relationship. 
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Over the last 13 years, U.S. Army National Guard Special Forces (ARNG-SF) 
units have seen an increased level of overseas utilization during Operations Enduring 
Freedom, Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn. The majority of operational missions have been 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, with a few deployments to the Pacific Rim, Caribbean Islands, 
and Central and South America. Each mission was designed to relieve a portion of the 
stress felt by the active duty Special Forces (AC-SF), but none of them achieved a level 
reaching the requirement of the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, 
Admiral William McRaven, for a dwell time equal to the time spent in an operational 
mission. A number of articles and papers have addressed the continued utilization of the 
ARNG-SF to maintain relevance and to continue relieving the stress on the AC-SF units. 
Each ARNG-SF unit has a statement in its mission (or an entirely additional mission 
statement) that addresses its unique responsibility to provide support to respective state 
adjutants general and governors. However, their use during domestic operations—
specifically, operations that could assist in the maintenance of special operations skills—
has not been addressed substantially in the scholarly literature. 
Because members of Army National Guard Special Operations Forces are 
authorized for dual missions, unlike their active duty counterparts, ARNG-SF units are 
uniquely positioned to provide assistance in both homeland defense and civil support 
during emergencies. Special Operations Command – North is also authorized to provide 
high level of leadership that can coordinate efforts across the nation by providing advice 
to both state and Title 10 military leadership. However, the lack of strategic guidance and 
the narrow focus of laws authorizing the use of the Army National Guard Special 
Operations Forces domestically hamper the broad-reaching capabilities available within 
the force structure accessible to governors and adjutants general.  
As such, this thesis begins with the premise that the Army National Guard Special 
Forces (ARNG – SF) possesses a unique but poorly understood capability within the 
Army National Guard. ARNG – SF’s ability to conduct unconventional warfare, direct 
action, foreign internal defense, and special reconnaissance is doctrinally mandated (and 
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are identical to active duty Special Forces units); but their ability to adapt these skills to 
domestic operations that the regular Army is prevented by Posse Comitatus1 restrictions, 
is a worthy topic for deeper exploration.  
This thesis will begin this exploration by addressing the following set of nested 
questions:   
1. How can the Army National Guard Special Operation Forces units be 
better utilized in order to support their State, Special Operations 
Command – North, and the Global SOF Network as a whole?  
2. What role might Special Operations Command – North play in the defense 
support to civil authority arena?   
3. What missions are currently being assumed under Title 322 and what 
initiatives are currently being pursued?  
4. What positions should be filled in Special Operations Command – North 
by members of the National Guard? 
This exploration will use a qualitative method and sources. Primary sources will 
include archived local, state and federal policy documents, government reports, and first-
person interviews. Secondary sources will include the analytical and historical accounts 
derived from the literature. Interviews and personal experience will also be relied upon 
for clarification and development of outcomes and outputs.   
The first section will focus on the roles of the Army National Guard as a whole, 
and the specific roles assigned to Army National Guard Special Forces domestically. 
Herein the legal authorities (Title 32) of the National Guard and Active Duty military will 
                                                 
1 Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus Act of 1956. Public Law 103–322 § 330016 (1) (L), 
U.S. Statutes at Large 108 (1994): 2147. 
2 National Guard Act of 1956. Public Law 113–65 § 2, U.S. Statutes at Large 596 (2004): 1880. Title 
32 USC authorizes the Governor (or senior executive) of the state, district or territory to utilize their 
National Guard forces, as they deem necessary within their state boundaries. This is commonly seen during 
natural or manmade disasters when a Governor may call their National Guard to assist in hurricane, wild 
fire or earthquake relief or during situations such as the bombing of the Boston Marathon in 2013. 
Depending on the situation the funds used to pay the National Guard troops either comes from the 
Department of Defense or in some less common cases must be funded from within the State treasury. For 
this paper I will use Title 32 to refer to situations when the Governor has authorized the National Guard to 
operate within their state in order to support law enforcement missions, provide civil relief during natural or 
manmade disasters and providing training to military and law enforcement.  
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also be discussed along with the challenges of the two commands. Finally, the role and 
responsibility of the newly established Special Operations Command – North will be 
analyzed.   
The second part of this thesis will analyze the policies that affect homeland 
defense and the National Guard’s role inside it. A review of state and federal authorities 
and cases will be used as a framework for this analysis. The regulations that guide 
counter-drug operations, law enforcement support and training programs currently being 
pursued by the Army National Guard Special Forces will also be studied. A common 
theme that will be identified is the lack of direction and a concrete plan to implement the 
guidance from the Executive Branch and policy.  
The third part will focus on the incorporation of Special Operations Command – 
North into the homeland defense framework and how the Army National Guard Special 
Forces can support the new command. I then conclude with a discussion of 
recommendations for developing guidance and possible funding strategies for the future 
missions. These recommendations will include broadening existing authorities and 
policies for Army National Guard Special Operations Forces, Army National Guard 
personnel assigned to Special Operations Command – North, and funding solutions for 
the increased domestic missions and personnel support. 
 4 
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II. THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 
In the 17 states that have Special Operations Forces units, there have been a 
number of times that Special Forces soldiers have been used in response to natural or 
manmade disasters or have provided assistance to local law enforcement and emergency 
agencies, such as Hurricane Katrina and the Florida Counterdrug Program. During 




 Special Forces Group 
(3/20 SFG) from Florida established a law enforcement coordination cell in the Harrah’s 
Casino outside of New Orleans to assist in the coordination of search and rescue efforts 
through the city.3 In this capacity, the 3/20
th
 SFG leadership held daily tasking briefings 
that coordinated the search-and-rescue efforts for the day between the myriad of law 
enforcement and military entities that were assisting in Louisiana. Third Battalion, 
Twentieth Special Forces Group was also designated as the headquarters for the Special 
Forces Task Force that oversaw the utilization and tasking of the ARNG – SF units sent 
from Colorado, California, Utah, Florida, Alabama and Mississippi.4  A core unit of 
experienced and flexible soldiers allowed 3/20
th
 Special Forces Group to quickly adapt to 
the situation on the ground and to begin efficient operations during a major domestic 
crisis. Florida has utilized an entire Special Forces Detachment – Alpha (ODA) to 
conduct support for the Florida Counterdrug Program in the past. Today the Ground 
Reconnaissance Team is led by members of the Special Forces Battalion but has both 
Army National Guard General Purpose troops and Special Forces qualified soldiers 
making up its ranks. This group provides surveillance support and training to Florida law 
enforcement agencies investigating drug production and trafficking. Again, the maturity 
and experience of those in ARNG – SF allows coordinated efforts within the state to fight 
domestic problems efficiently and effectively.  
                                                 
3 Jeffrey Pounding, “After Action Review: Special Forces Task Force Response to Hurricane Katrina” 
presentation to the Army National Guard Special Forces Advisory Council (SOFAC), Arlington, VA, 
January 2006. 
4 Steve Alvarez, Alabama Guard Provides Critical Disaster Response, (Montgomery, AL: American 
Forces Press Service, 2005). 
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With the establishment of Special Operations Command—North (SOCNORTH) 
in 2013, a Title 105 headquarters that became fully operational in August 20146 and has 
the responsibility to support, resource and command and control special operations units 
within the Northern Command (NORTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Each of the 
other Theater Special Operations Command’s (TSOCs) has a number of National 
Guardsmen on staff that provide expertise on how to find, mobilize and utilize National 
Guard units and personnel within their respective theater. There has not been a designated 
Army National Guard Special Forces representative that focuses on assisting the special 
operations community within NORTHCOM. With the formation of SOCNORTH, and 
the future assignment of designated Army National Guard soldiers to the command, the 
ability to coordinate ARNG – SF domestic missions across the country can be met.  
A. ROLE OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 
The Army National Guard is a component of the U.S. Army that is made up of 
elements within the 50 states and four territories (the latter are: U.S. Virgin Islands, 
Guam, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia) of the United States. The Army 
National Guard has both state and federal missions. Under the state chain of command, 
the Army National Guard reacts to emergencies, storms, disasters and civil disturbances 
through the adjutant general and is responsible to their respective governor. The president 
can also call upon the Army National Guard in times of emergency in order to provide 
combat, combat support and combat service support to the active component of the 
military.7 
The Army National Guard is made up primarily of traditional members who 
attend drill once a month and conduct a group annual training once a year (usually two 
                                                 
5 As was discussed earlier with Title 32 USC, Title 10 USC is the legal basis for federally funding, 
manning, equipping and controlling a military force for the defense of the United States. 
6 Organization and General Military Powers Act of 1962. Public Law 87–651 § 203, U.S. Statute at 
Large 519 (2013) 76.  
7 “About Us, the Army National Guard,” The Army National Guard, accessed 28 August 2014 
http://www.arng.army.mil/aboutus/Pages/default.aspx  
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weeks in duration).8  The remainder of the Army National Guard is made up of members 
of the Active Guard or Reserve (AGR) force. These soldiers work in either a Title 32 or 
Title 10 status. The Title 32 AGR force works within their respective states and conduct 
missions that range from running and maintaining the individual armories and unit 
records, to resourcing training and interacting with the National Guard Bureau about 
federal funds and equipment. The Title 10 AGR force works with the active component, 
within the Army National Guard Directorate, or on the National Guard Bureau or Joint 
Staff and assist in policy development, federal resourcing requirements, or training and 
mission development and tracking. The three categories of members work together in 
order to meet both the State and Federal missions tasked to their units and must maintain 
a balance within the dual mission requirements. Unlike the Army Reserve, the Army 
National Guard maintains a combat focus with their organic Infantry, Armor, Aviation 
and Special Forces units.   
Within the Army National Guard force structure there are a number of Special 
Operations units. The two Special Forces Groups and ten Special Operations 
Detachments are spread across fifteen states. The 19
th
 Special Forces Group (Airborne) is 
headquartered in Draper, Utah. Their three subordinate Battalions are headquartered in 
Utah (1
st
 Battalion), West Virginia (2
nd
 Battalion) and Colorado (5
th
 Battalion). The 20
th
 
Special Forces Group (Airborne) is headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama with 
subordinate Battalions in Alabama (1
st
 Battalion), Mississippi (2
nd
 Battalion) and Florida 
(3
rd
 Battalion). Along with the two Groups, the Special Operations Detachments (SOD’s) 
are spread across ten states. Rhode Island (SOD-G), Maryland (SOD-G2), West Virginia 
(SOD-E), North Carolina (SOD-X), Florida (SOD-C), Mississippi (SOD-S), Texas 
(SOD-A), Colorado (SOD-K) and California (SOD-N) and Washington (SOD-P) each 
are a unit that supports either a Theater Special Operations Command or other Special 
Operations elements. The figure below identifies locations, types and affiliations of the 
Special Operations Forces within the Army National Guard Force Structure. 
                                                 
8 Required Drills and Field Exercises Act of 1956. Public Law 109–364 § 502, U.S. Statute at Large 
120 (2006): 2195. 
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Figure 1.  Army National Guard Special Operations Forces Locations.9 
B. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES WITHIN TITLE 10  
The Army National Guard is an element of the U.S. Army under state command 
and control unless called upon by the President for federal active duty.10  Under Title 10 
USC §101 (c) the Army National Guard is also a portion of the reserve component to the 
Army.11  This link between state and federal entity provides the President access to 
additional forces when needed. The ARNG – SF units must maintain a level of training 
                                                 
9 Timothy Hoban, “Army National Guard Special Forces Force Structure Update,” presentation given 
October 2013 to the Army National Guard Special Operations Forces Advisory Committee (Alexandria, 
VA 2013). There are a total of 18 states that have a Special Operations Unit assigned to their force 
structure, as seen in the figure above. Kentucky has the three Military Intelligence Detachments that fall 
directly under the 20
th
 Special Forces Group Headquarters Company, Montana has the Chemical 
Reconnaissance Detachment from the 19
th
 Special Forces Group Headquarters and Nebraska has 195
th
 
Forward Support Company that is subordinate to the Support Brigade in the U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command. Though they are Special Operations units they do not have Special Forces Qualified soldiers 
assigned, they are support units that deploy with their higher headquarters or when needed to support other 
Special Operations units. 
10 Perpich vs. Department of Defense. 496 U.S. 334 (1990). 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/496/334/case.html (accessed 3 September 2014). 
11 Definitions Act of 1956. Public Law 112–239 § 68, U.S. Statute at Large 126 (2013) 1795. 
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that meets the intention of both state and federal leadership within their core tasks. The 
seven core tasks of Special Forces are the same whether on active duty or a member of 
the ARNG – SF.   
1. Unconventional Warfare  
Army Field Manual 3–05.20 Special Forces Operations, defines Unconventional 
Warfare as “a broad range of military and/or paramilitary operations and activities, 
normally of long duration, conducted through, with or by indigenous or other surrogate 
forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and otherwise directed in varying 
degrees by an external source.”12  Special Forces soldiers in Afghanistan conducted UW 
in order to overthrow the Taliban in the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom. 
2. Foreign Internal Defense 
Foreign Internal Defense is defined in Joint Publication 1–02 as participation by 
civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by 
another government or designated organization to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.13  Special Forces soldiers are currently 
conducting FID type missions in Afghanistan and other nations around the world by 
training and advising military and police elements in order to strengthen the current 
governments of the host countries and support the USSOCOM Global SOF Network.14 
3. Direct Action 
This is the easiest defined task of the Special Forces. A direct action mission is a 
short-duration strike and/or other small scale offensive action conducted as a special 
operation in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environment that employ specialized 
                                                 
12 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations (FM 3–05.20) (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2006) 2–1. 
13 Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (JP 1–02) (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2010) 100. 
14 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations (FM 3–05.20) (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2006) 2–3. 
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military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated 
targets.15   
4. Special Reconnaissance 
Unlike the reconnaissance assets found in the conventional military units, Special 
Forces are used in “hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or 
verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities 
not normally found in conventional forces…SR may include information on activities of 
an actual or potential enemy or secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or 
geographic characteristics of a particular area.”16   
5. Counter Terrorism 
The operations are ones that include offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, 
preempt, and respond to terrorism. Hostage rescue, recovery of sensitive materials and 
attacks against terrorist networks or infrastructure are examples of CT missions.17 
6. Counter Proliferation 
Actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture or recover weapons of 
mass destruction are considered counter proliferation operations. Special Forces 
Detachments identified to conduct these operations normally undergo specialized 
advanced training in order to safely handle the materials, protect themselves and the 
populations affected.18 
                                                 
15 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations (FM 3–05.20) (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2006) 2–3. 
16 Ibid., 2–4. 
17 Ibid., 2–5. 
18 Ibid., 2–6. 
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7. Support to Information Operations 
Army Special Operations Forces support information operations in order to 
achieve information superiority over an adversary.19  The most common example of this 
support is demonstrated in the key leader engagements conducted by Special Forces 
soldiers in order to understand affected population points of view and counter/preempt 
negative messaging by subversive forces. 
The ARNG – SF units are expected to maintain a proficient level of expertise in 
each of these combat focused tasks in order to support military operations overseas. 
During domestic use, the ARNG – SF units exercise special reconnaissance in support of 
law enforcement agencies, assist in support to law enforcement/state information 
messaging, instruct law enforcement agencies in direct action type activities, and 
instruct/advise law enforcement agencies on techniques used in unconventional warfare 
to be used in anti-gang task forces and efforts, again in a support role to law enforcement 
agencies. 
C. ARNG – SF WITHIN TITLE 32 AND STATE ACTIVE DUTY  
Title 32 is the most common legal status for the ARNG – SF. Whenever 
completing their weekend drills or annual training requirements, the ARNG – SF soldier 
is using federal funding while under state control. Title 32 § 502 requires the members of 
the ARNG to drill 48 times per year and conduct an annual training that is no less than 15 
days in length.20  The ARNG – SF units are also required to meet this standard, though 
their annual training events are generally a minimum of 21 days and often times are 
overseas working with foreign militaries. 
D. GUIDANCE, POLICY AND DOCTRINE 
Identifying strategic guidance for the use of the Army National Guard Special 
Operations Forces domestically will further narrow the gap between the efforts of the 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Required Drills and Exercises Act of 1956, 32 USC § 502 (1994). 
 12 
United States Special Operations Command overseas and those efforts led by law 
enforcement agencies at home. The Army National Guard Special Operations Forces 
have a unique capability to operate within the states under the command of the respective 
governor and/or adjutant general and in support of law enforcement officers but there is 
little to no coordination from one state to another and there is no legal or bureaucratic 
link between the Special Operations Forces while under Title 32 (or State Active duty) 
and Special Operations Command – North, the element charged with command and 
control of Special Operations Forces in the Northern Command area of responsibility. 
ARNG SOF are capable of providing highly trained and educated soldiers to support the 
governors and adjutants general plans and, with a dedicated group of soldiers at Special 
Operations Command – North, a direct tie into the Title 10 military command element. 
Clear guidance and authorities must be identified in order to ensure this relationship 
grows while at the same time respecting the individual authorities provided to the 
governors within their states and the Commander of SOCNORTH. 
The White House’s Strategy for combating Transnational Organized Crime 
identifies that organized crime syndicates “pose a significant and growing threat to 
national and international security…”21 and lays out a framework to fight this growing 
trend. Of significant importance is the identification of terror networks that are using the 
established logistic chains and funding opportunities established by these crime 
syndicates to further their efforts to possibly infiltrate the United States using drug and 
human trafficking channels.22  The Presidents strategy identifies five major policy 
directives that remain vague and open for interpretation. In his U.S. Army War College 
Civilian Research Project, Lieutenant Richard Drew identified that even three plus years 
after the publication of the Presidents strategy to combat transnational criminal 
organizations no single entity has been designated as the lead agency to coordinate this 
                                                 
21 “Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security,” The 




fight.23  Drew goes on to say, “If the threat posed by TCOs warranted a strategy from the 
White House to fight it then a plan to implement the strategy must follow at some point. 
With all the agreement that there must be a new whole-of-government (WOG) approach 
to address these threats, what are the organizational and legislative changes required to 
combat these expanding and converging threats?”24  Strategic level direction has been 
given but what attempts have been made to implement methods to focus on this 
guidance?  Ideally, there would be one entity assigned overall responsibility for the effort 
that maintains the professionalism of the force, to identify and understand the complex 
authorities, and be willing to educate all parties in the capabilities within the variety of 
tools available to state and federal governments. The following pages will show how that 
idea remains unrealized.  
  
                                                 
23 Richard Drew, “Implementing the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Much 
Reorganization Required.” (Civilian Research Project, United States Army War College, 2014) 1. 
24 Ibid. 4. 
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III. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES DOMESTIC 
OPERATIONS 
A. NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES 
Support to civil authorities is the second task listed within the NORTHCOM 
mission statement and is a difficult, critical and often contentious mission.25  Northern 
Command as a whole has attempted to be as proactive as possible when there has been a 
disaster domestically. From pushing members of the 82
nd
 Airborne Division to Louisiana 
following Hurricane Katrina in 2005 to deploying multiple units from all components to 
New York and New Jersey in response to Hurricane Sandy in October of 2012. The 
responsibility for Defense Support to Civil Authority is delegated to NORTHCOM in 
Joint Publication 3–28 for the contiguous 48 states and Alaska.26  The Commander of 
Pacific Command is responsible for coordinating DSCA response for Hawaii and Guam 
and maintains a similar relationship with the National Guard Bureau as the Commander 
of NORTHCOM.27   
Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) is defined as “support provided by 
federal military forces, the DOD civilians, contractors and the National Guard Forces 
(when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors, elect and request the 
forces in a Title 32 status) in response to a request for assistance from civil authorities for 
domestic emergencies, law enforcement support and other domestic activities or from 
                                                 
25 “NORTHCOM Fact Sheet,” United States Northern Command, accessed 10 September 2014 
http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/FactSheets/ArticleView/tabid/3999/Article/1891/usnorthcom-
vision.aspx 
26 Department of Defense, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, (Joint Publication 3–28) 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013) II-7. 
27 I will focus the research on the relationship between NORTHCOM, the National Guard Bureau, the 
State National Guard forces and other government agencies with the assumption that the process are similar 
for Hawaii and Guam but the Title 10 military command is different. Pacific Command (PACOM) shares 
the unique relationship with the state of Hawaii as NORTHCOM does with Colorado. The only major 
difference in the DSCA response for PACOM is the logistical needs based on the vast distances between 
Hawaii and the mainland and Guam and any other developed country. 
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qualifying entities for special events.”28  The broad ranges of activities that qualify under 
DSCA include natural disaster response (hurricanes, earthquakes, etc.), manmade disaster 
response (terrorist attack, hazardous material spills, etc.) or special events (political 
conventions, sporting events, etc.). In many circumstances the National Guard will be the 
first units that respond or are identified as supporting these events. This is done for two 
major reasons, the governors prefer to maintain control of the forces operating within 
their states and while in a Title 32 or State Active Duty status, the Posse Comitatus Act 
does not apply to National Guard forces.29  This allows the National Guard personnel to 
provide direct support to law enforcement officers without gaining special permission 
from the Secretary of Defense or President, (and falls under the law of each state).   
The Army National Guard also has the ability to loan forces from one state to 
another when agreed upon by the respective state governments. The Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) allows states to support one another quickly 
in moments of crisis. In 2005, Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama all relied on Army 
National Guard units to provide assistance to their states following Hurricane Katrina. 
After Hurricane Sandy in 2012, New York and New Jersey did the same. These 
agreements allow a quick response between states that might need a capability that is held 
in a neighboring state. The ARNG – SF units have been used in these capacities as 
mentioned previously. This mechanism can easily be used in the future to coordinate 
operations that support law enforcement and SOCNORTH.  
Special Operations Forces within the Army National Guard have supported and 
are supporting civil authorities currently. During the 2012 Republican National 
Convention (RNC) held in Tampa, Florida, NORTHCOM was tasked with supporting the 
United States Secret Service (USSS) in providing security and logistics for the 
convention. The USSS, under the Department of Homeland Security, is designated as the 
                                                 
28 Department of Defense, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, (Joint Publication 3–28) 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013) 1–2. 
29 Ibid., I-6. 
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primary agency during National Special Security Events (NSSE).30  During these events 
multiple federal, state and local agencies are involved. While the U.S. Secret Service is 
the lead agency and all others play a supporting role, the Department of Defense 
normally utilizes both active and reserve component forces to provide their piece of 
support when requested.31   
During the 2012 RNC, Lieutenant General Steven Hummer, was designated as the 
military task force commander by NORTHCOM. Under his leadership members of the 
Florida Army National Guard were provided by the Governor of Florida to provide 
support to the overall convention. The Special Operations Detachment – Central (SOD-
C) was tasked with providing the core staff for LTG Hummer.32  SOD-C is made up of 
36 officers and senior non-commissioned officers as a staff augmentation unit for their 
supported Theater Special Operations Command.33  From August 15 through August 24, 
this SOF element operated effectively within their Title 32 authority and provided a 
national level event with direct support and was the core coordinating staff for the 
Department of Defense’s Task Force. However, little to no situational awareness was 
provided through official channels that these Special Operations soldiers and equipment 
were used in support of civil authorities. The Florida National Guard and National Guard 
Bureau were made aware of a list of units supporting the event, but no direct reports were 
provided to the NORTHCOM Special Operations Detachment or U.S. Special Operations 
Command.34  In no way is this a violation of authorities, but the information could have 
                                                 
30 Ibid., IV-1. 
31 Ibid., IV-2. 
32 Major, W. Fillyaw, (full time administrator of Special Operations Detachment – Central) in 
discussion with the author, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, 28 July 2014. 
33 SOD-C is based in MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida and provides staff augmentation to 
Special Operations Command – Central. It is an element commanded by an Army Special Forces Colonel 
with a Special Forces Command Sergeant Major as his Senior Enlisted Advisor. Of the 36 positions in the 
SOD, 18 are specified as Special Forces billets. The SOD is primarily used in the Central Command area of 
responsibility as augmentation to special operations headquarters elements in the Mideast. Within the state 
of Florida, SOD-C is tasked as a command and control element for National Guard response in support of 
civil authority. 
34 Major, W. Fillyaw, (full time administrator of Special Operations Detachment – Central) in 
discussion with the author, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, 28 July 2014. 
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been shared more efficiently to ensure all concerned parties were at least aware of the 
activities of subordinate units that are provided resources from Major Force Program – 11 
(MFP – 11).35 
B. NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF 
COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS 
1. Authorities  
Under the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global 
Threats (DASD (CN & GT)), the Defense Department is tasked as the “single lead 
agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illicit drugs into the 
United States and an important contributor to national efforts to counter transnational 
organized crime, conducts operations and activities to disrupt and degrade the national 
security threats posed by drug trafficking, piracy, transnational organized crime and 
threat finance networks reasonably related to illicit drug trafficking activities.”36  The 
focus on aerial and maritime routes of trafficking leaves open the land domain crossing 
from Canada and Mexico. These two crossing areas are under the authority of the 
Department of Homeland Security, with their lead agency, Customs and Border Patrol. 
This delineation is mainly due to the capabilities found in each of the separate 
departments and has been well coordinated in the past. It is however, the land domain 
that the Army National Guard and Special Operations Command – North could have the 
most important effects. 
Title 32 USC § 112 gives the authority to the National Guard Bureau to 
coordinate and conduct drug interdiction and counterdrug activities under the command 
of the individual governors and Adjutants General of the state National Guard forces.37  
This authority is further supported by the DASD (CN & GT) objective under their second 
                                                 
35  “Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms,” Defense Acquisition University,  
accessed 3 November 2014, https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/pages/2192.aspx  
36 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (CN & GT), Counternarcotics & Global Threats Strategy, 
Washington, DC: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (CN & GT) 2011. 
37 Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities Act of 1989. Public Law 108–375 § 116 (k), U.S. 
Statute at Large 118 (2004) 1869. 
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strategic goal of preventing drug and precursor trafficking within the western 
hemisphere.38  The DASD CN & GT specifically states they will enhance the National 
Guard support to border areas through the intelligence analysis, transportation, linguistic 
and detection and monitoring capabilities.39   
C. NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU COUNTERDRUG 
The National Guard Bureau’s Operations Directorate in Arlington, Virginia 
administers the National Guard Bureau’s Counterdrug program. The state counterdrug 
plans are validated and consolidated for submittal to the Department of the Army and on 
to the Secretary of Defense for approval and resourcing through the National Guard 
Bureau.40  Once validated and resourced the States’ National Guard Counterdrug 
Coordinators are the managers of the programs within their respective states. Under NGB 
Regulation 500–2, six mission sets are authorized.41  These missions are: 
1. Program Management 
This task is simply the overall management of the counterdrug program and 
includes liaison support to law enforcement agencies, resource management, and 
personnel and equipment management.42  Each of these sub-tasks are conducted by 
Special Forces soldiers when deployed overseas in the daily operations of a Special 
Forces Detachment. 
2. Linguist Support / Investigative Case and Analyst Support 
The second mission category is a broad spectrum of support to law enforcement 
agencies. Providing translation of written, audio and video recordings is authorized, 
                                                 
38 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (CN & GT), Counternarcotics & Global Threats Strategy, 
Washington, DC: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (CN & GT) 2011.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Department of Defense, National Guard Bureau Counterdrug Operations, (NGB 500–2) 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008) 1. 
41 Ibid., 5–6. 
42 Ibid., 5. 
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however active/real time translations are not.43  This mission set also encompasses case 
analysis support focusing on link analysis, document exploitation, commodity-financial 
analysis and case construction.44  The final two sub-tasks are communication and 
subsurface/diver support.45  The establishment and maintenance of a communications 
network during law enforcement activities is a task uniquely suited for Special Forces 
soldiers. The Special Forces Communications Sergeant is an expert in this very task in 
the most austere environments using a variety of communications hardware. 
Subsurface/diver support encompasses supporting law enforcement agencies in hull 
inspections of vessels within ports of entry within the United States.46  These two tasks 
are specifically trained in the Special Warfare Center and School, the same institution 
that is responsible for the Special Forces Qualification Course.   
3. Domestic Cannabis Suppression Operations Support 
The assistance provided to a law enforcement agency through aerial, logistic, 
communication, intelligence, planning, medical, physical security and destruction of 
contraband all fall under this mission task.47 
4. Counterdrug-Related Training and Training LEA/Military Personnel 
The training portfolio under the National Guard Bureaus counterdrug program 
tasks the National Guard with providing courses to military units and law enforcement 
agencies in “subjects and skills useful in the conduct of CD operations.”48 
5. Reconnaissance/Observation 
Reconnaissance/Observation is a broad ranging mission set that allows for ground 
reconnaissance, unattended sensor support, maritime reconnaissance, use of ground 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. . 
45 Ibid. 6. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid. 
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surveillance radar, aerial reconnaissance, and use of specialized infrared visual 
enhancement items in order to support law enforcement activities.49 
6. Demand Reduction Support 
The final mission is to provide education programs to the youth of the state in 
support of the counterdrug program and promote drug free lives for the population.50 
These six mission sets allow a great number of opportunities within which the 
Army National Guard Special Forces units and soldiers may bring their maturity and 
specialized training to bear in order to support law enforcement agencies.   






 Special Forces Group from the Florida Army National 
Guard has extensive experience working within the Florida Counterdrug program. 




 Special Forces Group within its force 
structure. The 3/20
th
 Special Forces Battalion Headquarters, Support Company and two 
line companies are spread throughout the state. With the constant threat of hurricanes, 
Florida relies on the entirety of its National Guard to assist in natural disaster response. In 
the past the state has relied heavily on the 3/20
th
 Special Forces Group to assist in these 
responses and has also leaned heavily on this Battalion to support the state counterdrug 
plan. The Florida Ground Reconnaissance Team is currently made up of six members of 
the Florida National Guard, with its leaders all coming from the 3/20
th
 Special Forces 
Group. This team is tasked with supporting law enforcement agencies with the 
reconnaissance/observation, subsurface/diver support, tagging and tracking subject 
vehicles and training.51  These activities are perfectly suited for Special Forces soldiers 
and are tasks that these soldiers are specifically trained for and required to maintain 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 6–7. 
50 Ibid., 7. 
51 Command Sergeant Major, S. Keane, (senior non-commissioned  officer of the Florida Counterdrug 
Program) in discussion with the author, St. Augustine, FL, 29 July 2014. 
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proficiency in. Unfortunately, diver support operations have been steadily declining due 
to deployments of qualified divers and budgetary constraints over the last year.52 
Members of the 3/20
th
 Special Forces Battalion also directly support the Florida 
Counterdrug Academy. The Florida Counterdrug Academy is tasked with providing 
training to military units and civilian law enforcement agencies in a variety of subjects 
under the Florida Counterdrug Plan.53  The Counterdrug Academy in Florida is one of 
five throughout the country and is the only one that offers courses in jungle environment 
land navigation, personal security detachment operations, advanced marksmanship, 
tactical medicine, active shooter response, and they will begin offering courses in 
counter-threat financing in fiscal year 2014. 
E. ANALYSIS 
These tasks of manning and conducting operations of the Ground Reconnaissance 
Team and the Florida Counterdrug Academy within the National Guard Bureaus 
counterdrug program are ideally suited for Special Forces soldiers because of their 
extensive training in the specific tasks required. The state uses the units and soldiers in a 
means that plays to their strengths and provides the best opportunity for learning for the 
law enforcement officers. The Special Forces soldier learns each of these tasks while 
attending the Special Forces Qualification Course in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. They 
are required to continuously train in their specialty along with conducting cross training 
outside of their specialty prior to any deployment and while deployed overseas. While 
conducting these training events with the law enforcement agencies, the Special Forces 
soldier is also tightening the inter-agency bonds and further developing relationships.   
The Florida Counterdrug Academy has seen an increase in requests for training 
from a variety of agencies also. The Customs and Border Patrols – Tactical Unit 
(BORTAC) will be conducting a week long jungle course in Florida within fiscal year 
2013, the Drug Enforcement Administration offices in Florida conduct three to four 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 “Mission Statement for FMCTFT,” Florida Multijurisdictional Counterdrug Task Force Training, 
accessed 15 September 2014, http://mctft.counterdrugschools.com/home/mission 
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training courses every year, the Puerto Rico National Guard has requested courses in 
fiscal year 2014 and 2015, and state and local law enforcement agencies keep the 
academy busy throughout the remainder of the year.54  This broad range of engagements 
increase the reputation and increases the likelihood of law enforcement agencies to 
request the unit/soldiers they have come to know if/when needed to assist in homeland 
security situations.   
F. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE GLOBAL SOF NETWORK AND 
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
1. The SOCOM Global SOF Network 
In his 2014 Posture Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, Admiral 
McRaven identified the Global SOF Network’s need to maintain a presence forward 
based and deployed in order to persistently engage our partners and deter, prevent and 
when needed defeat our adversaries.55  Admiral McRaven went on to identify the need to 
re-align Special Operations Forces to support the Theater Special Operations Commands 
in order to better support their campaign plans while maintaining the Special Operations 
Forces regional expertise in both culture and languages.56  However, there is no mention 
to the special needs of what can be done domestically to close the gap between groups 
operating overseas and what is being done and what can be done domestically by civilian 
law enforcement agencies (LEA’s). Special Operations Command – North is tasked to be 
the conduit for the Global SOF Network domestically and has a focus on Mexico that 
plays directly into the Global SOF Network. However, Special Operations Command – 
North has no dedicated units supporting domestic missions.   
The link between what terrorist, narcotic and other criminal organizations that 
would see harm done to American citizens and infrastructure and what is being done 
                                                 
54 Command Sergeant Major, S. Keane, (senior non-commissioned officer of the Florida Counterdrug 
Program) in discussion with the author, St. Augustine, FL, 29 July 2014. 
55 Posture Statement of Admiral William McRaven: Hearing Before the House Armed Service 
Committee, House of Representatives, 113
th
 Cong., 5 (2014) (statement of Admiral William McRaven, 
Commander U.S. Special Operations Command). 
56 Ibid., 5. 
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domestically is lacking. Hezbollah is one such organization that has branched out across 
the globe to facilitate its operations. Designated a terrorist organization by the United 
States and European Union,57 Hezbollah supporters have been active within the United 
States in a variety of means. In 2002 operatives for Hezbollah were convicted of 
transporting cigarettes across states lines to sell at a higher profit then sending a portion 
of those profits to their commanders in Lebanon. In 2009 a group of ten operatives were 
convicted of providing material support to Hezbollah through trafficking of stolen 
passports, laptop computers and automobiles. In 2011 the Drug Enforcement 
Administration investigation $200 million were traced from cocaine sales in Europe and 
the Middle East to Hezbollah operations in Colombia and Lebanon.58  The criminal 
investigation for these types of activities will always be led by law enforcement agencies 
within the United States. However, Army National Guard Special Forces soldiers could 
assist in the network development, counter-threat finance and observation/reconnaissance 
of these types of activities. The link between what the military Special Operations 
community is doing overseas to combat such organizations and what is being done 
domestically allows a perfect position for SOCNORTH to bridge the gap between the 
Global SOF Network and domestic law enforcement and for opportunities for Army 
National Guard Special Forces to assist law enforcement and maintain their skills 
between deployments overseas.  
While under Title 10 authority mobilization orders the ARNG SOF units are 
utilized by the supported Theater Special Operations Command and fit into the Global 
SOF Network. When operating domestically under Title 32 authorities the ARNG SOF 
units work for the governors and Adjutants General of their respective states. At many 
times they are utilizing special operations-peculiar or unique techniques and equipment 
that was provided to them through the MFP-11 (Special Operations) funding line. With 
the separation of authorities, there is often a disconnect in the advising/collaboration and 
                                                 
57 Jonathan Masters and Zachary Laub, “Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hiz’bullah)” Council on Foreign 
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coordination of activities that are being done domestically to the Special Operations 
command structure.  





Forces Group a part of the North Carolina National Guard called a number of their 
soldiers in to prepare to support the coastal communities if needed. Part of their 
preparation was to establish communications with the sheriff and emergency response 
units along the North Carolina coast. During this preparation, the leadership from the 
company arranged for places to stay directly in the looming storm’s path that would 
provide a location for the Special Forces soldiers to hunker down during the storm and 
immediately begin providing damage estimates to the state emergency response center 
and begin assisting citizens of the effected communities. The soldiers that gathered were 
medics, engineers, communications specialists, and the leaders of a number of the Special 
Forces A-Teams all prepared to assume the risk of sitting in a building during a growing 
hurricane.  
Luckily the state did not need the extra support from the National Guard, but the 
major highlight of this circumstance was that at no time was the Army Special Forces 
Command notified that Special Forces qualified soldiers and their equipment were 
prepared for and waiting deployment orders to respond to a domestic operation under the 
command of their governor and adjutant general. Again, there was nothing wrong with 
the utilization of special operations peculiar or unique training and equipment in this 
scenario, but it is a case where Army Special Operations Command and U.S. Special 
Operations Command could garner great public awareness of their service members 
bringing their bravery, sacrifice and training to support their communities.59 
G. CONCLUSION 
The Special Forces soldier is normally a more mature and experienced individual 
than his conventional counterpart and has been assessed and trained because of this 
                                                 
59 This scenario is one that the author participated in and through conversations with Sergeant First 




 Special Forces Group, captured the North Carolina 
Special Forces units response to Hurricane Sandy. 
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personality trait.60  While other unit types or soldiers with different military occupational 
skills can execute some of SF’s core missions (e.g., Direct Action), the Special Forces 
soldier is expected to be able to accomplish direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign 
internal defense, unconventional warfare, counter-terrorism, counter proliferation and 
support to information operations while deployed.61  The Special Forces soldier is a 
multi-lingual military to military/ military to civilian teacher, an expert in ground 
reconnaissance, and oftentimes manages both money and training programs for 
indigenous forces. It can be argued that manning and running a state counterdrug 
program would provide additional training to the Special Forces soldier, while at the 
same time as meeting the governors counterdrug plan and supporting law enforcement 
agencies because of ARNG-SF’s unique skill set. 
With a wide range of possible situations that state leadership can face at any 
point, understanding the capabilities found within their state force structure is paramount 
to quick and timely responses or the ability to get in front of a situation prior to its 
execution. The threats posed by drug cartels and human trafficking rings are too great of 
a risk to ignore. SOCNORTH is ideally situated to establish a collaboration ring that 
brings law enforcement, Army National Guard Special Operations and the Global SOF 
Network together as a whole. Assisting in the coordination of EMACs specifically for 
SOF response to natural/manmade disasters and for collaboration  among law 
enforcement support across state lines, SOCNORTH command can be the element 
responsible for counter transnational criminal organizations for the U.S. government. The 
following section will review SOCNORTH’s responsibility and authorities in responding 
to threats to the homeland.  
                                                 
60 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations (FM 3–05.20) (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2006) 1–12. 
61 Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations (FM 3–05.20) (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2006) 2–2. 
 27 
IV. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND – NORTH AND 
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS 
A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND – NORTH  
Special Operations Command – North was a provisional command established in 
2013 at the request of the commanders of Northern Command and Special Operations 
command. Formerly the Special Operations Detachment within the NORTHCOM 
Operations Staff Directorate, SOCNORTH became operational in August of 2014. The 
command is tasked with “partnering to conduct homeland defense, civil support and 
security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interest and under 
NORTHCOM defend America’s homeland – protecting our people, national power and 
freedom of action.”62  
SOCNORTH is responsible for coordinating special operations activity in 
CONUS, Mexico, Canada and the Bahamas. They are also responsible for coordinating 
with federal, state and local law enforcement agencies for a continuation of effort within 
the Global SOF Network.63  SOCNORTH, like NORTHCOM, has a different, and 
arguably, more difficult mission than the other Theater Special Operations Commands. 
Both mission statements begin with “partners to conduct homeland defense…,”64 while 
the other Combatant Command mission statements begin with “conduct joint and 
combined full-spectrum military operations….”65  The necessity to “partner” within the 
NORTHCOM AOR is necessary to ensure compliance with the Posse Comitatus Act 
(PCA).66  This necessity requires the command to work within certain legal authorities 
                                                 
62 “United States Special Operations Command Factbook,” United States Special Operations 
Command, accessed 4 September 2014, 
http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_Fact_Book_2014.pdf. 
63 Ibid. 
64 “NORTHCOM Fact Sheet,” United States Northern Command, accessed 8 September 2014, 
http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/FactSheets/ArticleView/tabid/3999/Article/1891/usnorthcom-
vision.aspx. 
65 “SOUTHCOM Fact Sheet,” United States Southern Command, accessed 8 September 2014, 
http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Our-Missions.aspx. 
66 Use of Army and Air force as Posse Comitatus Act of 1956, 18 USC § 1385 (1994). 
 28 
and with law enforcement agencies (LEA) and other state entities in order to ensure 
mission completion and success.   
One of SOCNORTH’s responsibilities is to assist in response options to a Defense 
Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) requirement. The special operations community has 
not had a designated command and control element for these operations in the United 
States until now. Finalizing the link between the states Army National Guard Special 
Forces and SOCNORTH is the final hurdle in matching the units with the combatant 
command. The existing gap between responsibilities and authorities creates 
vulnerabilities with unknown negative consequences. 
Special Operations Command – North’s official mission states that the command 
will employ Special Operations Forces in partnership with the Interagency and Regional 
Special Operations Forces in order to defend the United States and support civil 
authorities.67  The desire and intent to play a role in the Global SOF Network is currently 
being resourced by the command as they grow. However, the limited number of service 
members assigned and the lack of adequate workspace has forced the command to 
prioritize and restrict the efforts of planning and engaging partners domestically. As the 
command continues to receive incoming personnel and the permanent facilities are 
prepared, the command must begin to branch out from the counter-terrorism and counter-
weapons of mass destruction focus and begin identifying how and where they may 
coordinate efforts to ensure the Global SOF Network begins to include the law 
enforcement agencies authorized to operate domestically, the States National Guard 
forces that can operate within their borders and provide Northern Command and Special 
Operations Command the awareness of where and how the MFP-11 personnel and 
equipment are being utilized to support civil authorities. 
A need to develop guidance that broadens the authority of the Global SOF 
Network was identified by the Rand Corporation in their “Developing and Assessing 
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Options for the Global SOF Network.”68  However, the Rand Corporations work also 
maintains a focus on overseas operations and do not identify the need for linking 
domestic operations with the Global SOF Network. Additional links between Title 32 
capabilities in support of law enforcement and the Title 10 command structure of 
SOCNORTH need to be identified. This would provide trained special operators that 
work within Title 32 for the governors while collaborating and coordinating with other 
such elements across state lines. The ability to successfully link Army National Guard 
Special Forces with the state and their law enforcement agencies and SOCNORTH would 
provide for a conduit between the Special Operations Forces overseas and the LEA’s 
working domestically. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Broadening of Authorities. 
A broadening of the National Guard Bureau’s authorities under counterdrug 
operations to include counter transnational criminal organization would provide an 
increase in capabilities to local, state and federal law enforcement agencies through the 
National Guard Bureaus Counterdrug Program. In the draft of Northern Commands 
estimate for Department of Defense support to Law Enforcement Along the Southwest 
Border, the command recommends this exact increase of authority noting that terrorist 
organizations have become intertwined with transnational criminal organizations.69  This 
policy change would have to be headed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Counternarcotics and Global Threats with support from the National Guard Bureau and 
Northern Command. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Drew in his Civilian Research Project 
for Georgetown University states that a new National Center for Combating 
Transnational Criminal Organizations is needed to coordinate the fight against this 
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threat.70  I agree with this assessment but feel that Special Operations Command – North 
is ideally situated for this purpose. With responsibility for coordinating Special 
Operations within the Northern Command area of responsibility, the established 
relationships with law enforcement agencies, the established relationships with the Army 
National Guard Special Forces, SOCNORTH can assume this responsibility fairly easily 
with a slight increase to their authorized manning. 
2. Assignment of Title 10 Active Guard/Reserve members to Special 
Operations Command – North.   
To assist in the assumption of coordinating counternarcotic and transnational 
criminal organizations and to assist in the coordination and collaboration across state 
lines, the National Guard Bureau will need to provide personnel to assist in this mission. 
The Title 10 Active Guard/Reserve program has personnel that are familiar with the 
authorities that affect these missions and have established relationships with the State 
National Guards that would allow a smoother coordination/collaboration between the 
states and federal assets. Providing the following officers and enlisted service members 
would be ideal; a Colonel (O6) as the deputy Commander or Operations Officer, a 
Lieutenant Colonel as the National Guard Advisor within the J3 (Operations Directorate), 
a Major as a strategic planner to focus on domestic operations planning and training 
events, a Chief Warrant Officer 2–4 within the J3 (Operations Directorate) to provide 
experience and expertise with National Guard domestic operations, a Master Sergeant or 
Sergeant First Class within the J1 (Personnel Directorate) in order to assist with Reserve 
Component personnel issues, and a Master Sergeant or Sergeant First Class within the J2 
(Intelligence Directorate) in order to provide experience and expertise with legalities of 
intelligence operations during domestic operations. The Army National Guard will need 
to identify positions to “pay the bill” for these positions. Some possibilities are; the re-
stationing of one of the officer positions currently in Special Operations Command – 
Africa, Central and South to Special Operations Command – North, re-stationing of two 
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of the enlisted positions at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Center to Special Operations 
Command – North, and the re-alignment of a Warrant Officer billet from the Army 
National Guard Operations Directorate (G3) to Special Operations Command – North.71  
Each of these positions should be identified as Special Forces Qualified (18 Series) 
personnel or (in the case of the J1) be filled by a service member with experience with 
the Army National Guard Special Operations Forces. At a minimum the Army National 
Guard should provide a senior Lieutenant Colonel and a Major to work in the J3 and J5 
and a senior NCO to assist in the J1. 
3. Army National Guard Special Forces Groups Liaisons 
In order to provide a designated tie to the National Guard Special Forces Groups 
the two Groups need to provide dedicated liaison officers that would be responsible for 
coordinating efforts between Special Operations Command – North and the operational 
units. These soldiers must be the best-qualified and proven members of their 
organizations. The men will be the personal representative of the Commander of their 
respective group and must be familiar with the capabilities held within their 
organizations. These soldiers must also understand the complexities of operating 
domestically and have a firm grasp of the different political and legal issues that the state 
governors and adjutants general must accommodate for when utilizing National Guard 
forces in support of their domestic missions. They will be responsible for the direct 
coordination between SOCNORTH and the leadership of their organization within their 
respective states during training events and real world responses. They do not need to be 
on yearlong orders, though this is optimal, but the positions should be filled during 
domestic emergencies and scheduled training events. A cost sharing arrangement would 
have to be agreed upon in order to pay the pay and allowances for these service members 
that would ensure the complete buy in of all parties.  
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4. Funding Issues 
Funding for these changes will be difficult in this time of declining budgets. 
However, with a cost sharing between the National Guard Bureau, Special Operations 
Command – North, the Army National Guard Special Operations Branch and the States 
the impact on any one sub-activity group would be diminished. A joint effort would need 
to be approached to ensure adding the new requirements to the future requests for funding 
would need to be coordinated. The common factor to estimate cost for personnel is $200 
per day per soldier. Using this factor it would cost approximately $73,000 per year to 
maintain a soldier on orders to support SOCNORTH and the domestic missions. The 
Title 10 Active Guard Reserve soldiers would not add any additional costs as they are 
already budgeted for through the Army National Guard. Therefore, the only additional 
costs would be for the liaisons from the two National Guard Groups, between the four 
entities that would benefit from having these soldiers assigned to SOCNORTH an equal 
breakdown would be less than $19,000 per year per soldier. The Special Operations 
Branch in the Army National Guard Operations Division is uniquely situated to lead this 
effort on the National Guards side as they have direct lines of communications with the 
States, Special Operations Command, and the National Guard Bureaus counterdrug 
offices. Special Operations Command – North would need to coordinate through 
Northern Command and Special Operations Command to request the authority to assist in 
funding these additional liaison officers and other critical items. This small investment 
would return a large payoff that is hard to measure.   
The newly formed Special Operations Detachment – North (SOD – N) would also 
be able to fill in any gaps for the SOCNORTH staff. SOD – N is a unit within the 
Colorado National Guard force structure and is the designated reserve component unit 
supporting SOCNORTH. Their normal drills and annual training events could easily be 
used to supplement the SOCNORTH staff and would add no additional cost during these 
statutorily mandated training timeframes. Having the National Guard soldiers conduct 
their drills and annual training with the command would also help in the establishment of 
personal relationships and would provide SOCNORTH with a known quantity if they are 
ever in need of a deployable command team. 
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5. Responsibilities and Authorities 
SOCNORTH must be involved in the tracking and coordination of Special 
Operations units when responding to domestic emergencies or when any ARNG – SOF 
unit is engaged in any type of law enforcement support. The ability of the Army Special 
Operations Command and the U.S. Special Operations Command to fully understand the 
experience, capability and usage of the ARNG – SOF units will never be fully 
accomplished unless the Theater Special Operations Command responsible for domestic 
operations is fully incorporated in the activities of the ARNG – SOF.   There also must be 
an understanding within SOCNORTH that the governor has the final say on how, when, 
who and why ARNG – SOF are used. Existing authorities separating state and federal 
entities must be recognized.   
The ARNG Special Operations Branch can assist the ARNG – SOF leaders in 
establishing Emergency Management Assistance Compacts between states where both 
have or only one of the two have SOF units within their force structure. This will have to 
be coordinated with the SOCNORTH, the ARNG Title 10 AGR soldiers and the effected 
states. No other entity is so ideally situated with this coordination responsibility, as long 
as all parties work together to work to one common goal.   
6. Education of Leaders 
The leadership within the Army National Guard Special Operations community 
must take it upon themselves to educate their own civilian and military leadership within 
their state on the capabilities that they can bring to aid in disaster or National Sensitive 
Security type events. The ARNG-SOF leaders must also ensure that the states without 
SOF understand what extra capabilities these units and soldiers can bring to bear on an 
event with little warning and great effect. Whether it be an element to establish 
emergency communications, advanced emergency medical aid, or command and control, 
the ARNG – SOF units are ideally suited to assist with little to no assistance for a short 
(2-5 days) duration. The ARNG – SOF leaders must also educate the active (Title 10) 
leadership on what authorities they fall under when working domestically and must be 
the entities that ensure the state leaders have access to and use these soldiers effectively. 
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The Title 10 AGR officers and non-commissioned officers within the Special Operations 
community must also educate the active duty leaders on the authorities that the state 
leaders maintain under Title 32 and ensure that there is as little friction as possible if the 
ARNG – SOF soldiers are called upon for any of the variety of domestic operations a 
governor might deem necessary. 
7. Conclusion 
The soldiers within the Army National Guard Special Operations community 
want to be utilized more often and want to help their states and the U.S. Government as 
much as possible, whether on overseas or domestic missions. They are all highly trained, 
motivated and willing to assist their communities or any community in the United States. 
Though the individual Special Operations soldier may cost more to call to duty for 
response to a domestic emergency than his conventional counterpart, Special Operations 
units can accomplish more with smaller overall numbers. It must be recognized that these 
soldiers won’t be able to secure large areas or provide large swaths of traffic control. 
However, a group of 6–12 Special Operations soldiers can establish an open 
communications network for a statewide first-responder enterprise. They can train local, 
state and federal law enforcement officers on techniques that will enhance their 
survivability and diminish threats to local population. They can establish command, 
control and coordination cells for immediate relief to local and federal emergency aid 
groups extremely effectively. 
Special Operations Command – North and the Army National Guard Special 
Forces will have to work closely together in the future in a wide range of missions under 
various authorities. The earlier initiatives are implemented to foster the relationship 
between all parties the smoother the response will be to the current threats our country 
faces on our borders and if another attack on our homeland occurs. The more time that 
passes before attempting to cement the relationship the more difficult it will be to change 
policies, authorities and opinions. 
The Army National Guard Special Forces units have been utilized in contingency 
operations overseas over the last thirteen years. However, with declining budgets and a 
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declining mission set in the Middle East the likelihood of the Army National Guard 
Special Forces being utilized overseas is dwindling. In order to maintain their capabilities 
the ARNG – SF units must either find training events or real world domestic operations 
that they can support. Law enforcement training and support and domestic emergencies 
provide the best situations for the Special Forces soldiers within the Army National 
Guard to practice their training and ensure that they are ready for operations overseas 
when called. 
Special Operations Command – North is positioned to be the conduit between the 
Army National Guard Special Forces and U.S. Special Operations Command as the 
National Guard conduct domestic operations. To enhance this relationship the Title 10 
Active Guard/Reserve soldiers that will be assigned to SOCNORTH must bridge the gap 
between the National Guard forces, the command structure and SOCNORTH in such a 
way that respects the autonomy of the governors/adjutant’s general but at the same time 
ensures that the military forces of the United States are tied together to ensure the safety 
of all Americans.   
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